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1. On the Relation between Ideality and Reality in Peirce 
In the Introduction to his Philosophie der Natur2, Friedrich Schelling already 
warned about the illusion that Kant’s critical philosophy had, finally and effect-
ively, buried empiric realism, notwithstanding having replaced it by an empiric 
idealism. This comment of Schelling, somewhat surprising, does not seem to 
acknowledge a radical inflexion intended by the transcendental Kantian philo-
sophy as regards a naïve realism associated with a «crude empirism»3, an ex-
pression, incidentally, he himself coined. Indeed, I consider that Schelling’s 
critique becomes understandable when we perceive it under the horizon of his 
philosophy of identity that seeks to dissolve all kinds of dichotomies between 
subjectivity and objectivity. Similar to Peirce and, on all accounts under this 
aspect, an inspirer of the starting point of Peircean philosophy, Schelling pro-
claims a genetic principle of unity for his philosophy, antecedent to any begin-
ning of a polarization between subject and object. This principle will be con-
summated in his doctrine of Objective Idealism that, deriving from a principle 
of unity, is based on the eidetic common nature of reality and ideality. Then, it 
is through the prism of Schellingean Idealism that the common territory be-
tween empiric realism and empiric idealism appears, and this becomes Schel-
ling’s object of critique. In fact, Schelling recognizes that both doctrines have 
something in common, namely, the inevitable polarization present in the sub-
ject-object relationship that, ultimately, Kant’s Copernican revolution had 
simply inverted: from the incognizability of das Ding an sich, to the transcenden-
tal forms that constitute the subject. In both, the common matrix of a strict 
nominalism can be discerned. And Schelling is, in light of his philosophies of 
Identity and Nature, a realistic thinker and, above that, the one who first re-
conciled realism and idealist wholly, even before Peirce had done in a more 
clearly logical manner4. 
Indeed, we emphasize that Peirce appreciatively credits Schelling with 
the foundations of his Objective Idealism5; this doctrine plays the role of ge-
netically depolarizing the subject-object relationship, at first in light of a sub-
stantial monism — i.e., affirming that ideality constitutes the ultimate ontologi-
                                                 
1 The item 1 of this essay has small parts of the paper Sobre a Identidade Ideal-Real na Filosofia de 
Charles S. Peirce, and the items 2 and 3 comprise the paper O Amor Criativo como Princípio Heurísti-
co na Filosofia de Peirce. These parts have already been published in Portuguese in 2000 and 2005, 
respectively, in «Cognitio-Revista de Filosofia». Associated with a brand new text written for 
this essay, they now appear in English under formal authorization by «Cognitio». 
2 SCHELLING 1988. 
3 This naïve realism, associated with a crude empiricism, was defended by Hume’s skepticism, 
and according to Schelling’s reading of Kant, constitutes the main object of analysis by Kantian 
philosophy. 
4 In a letter to W. James of January 28, 1894, Peirce stated: «My views were probably influ-
enced by Schelling - by all stages of Schelling, but especially by the Philosophie der Natur. I con-
sider Schelling as enormous; and one thing I admire about him is his freedom from the tram-
mels of system and his holding himself uncommitted to any previous utterance. In that, he is 
like a scientific man. If you were to call my philosophy as a Schellingism transformed in light 
of modern physics I should not take it hard». 
5 CP: 6.605, 1893. 
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cal fabric of both subjectivity and the reality of a world that, for such subjectiv-
ity, places itself fundamentally as another or, in Peircean terminology, as second. 
Peirce, however, goes further: the genetic subject-object depolarization in his 
philosophy is not solely substantial, but also favors a symmetrization of logical 
rights6 between both; one that is provided by the validity of his categories in-
differently to subjective and objective realms. This Herculean task will be per-
formed by his three categories that, undifferentiatedly, will be valid both on the 
plain of the subjectivity taken logically, and on its objective expression; in other 
words, on the spheres of representation and of reality as such. 
 
1.1 Reflections on Peirce’s Realism 
The vigorous defense of a realism of scholastic extraction that opposes any 
form of nominalism is a recurrent theme in Peirce’s writings7. A deeper under-
standing of this realism involves redeeming the ancient dispute of the univer-
sals that Peirce brings back. Peirce finds in Duns Scotus the paternity of his 
defense of the reality of generals. I consider this historic recovery of the issue 
fundamentally important when mentioning, within Peirce’s philosophy, the 
concept of realism. This is not an empirical realism8 in the sense criticized by 
Schelling, and which is designated by the term today, namely, a mere acknowl-
edgment of the existence of an external world of things. Realism of a Scotist 
extraction affirms the reality of universals that relate to things in their indivi-
duality9. Thus, when today we affirm a realism of mere acknowledgment of a 
world external to mind or language, we are, in light of the dispute of the uni-
versals as it was proposed by the scholastics, in effect solely adopting a nom-
inalist position. Indeed, the question of the existence of an external world was 
never an issue for either nominalists or realists. They were interested in another 
problem, namely, whether universals are real or just a figure of speech10. Peirce, 
incidentally, having provided a clear foundation of his Phenomenology, ex-
pounds in this science the experimental base of the belief in an external world, 
and he does so without polemicizing the issue by exposing the external world 
in terms of a universal reaction against consciousness; it essentially contains the 
concept of otherness implicit in its category of secondness. 
Also in his mature thought, Peirce improves his realism, deeming insuf-
ficient a realism of classes11 that, ultimately, only considers the correspondence 
between terms and their real generalities. In fact, in his endeavor of bringing 
the issue of universals back to the forefront, Peirce aims at a realism where real 
generality is represented by natural laws, taken as wide systems of real relations 
that can no longer be represented by mere concepts in their atomicity, but that 
require correspondence with theories that seek to describe the general conduct 
of complex objects, when taken as continuous phenomenical systems, and not 
just individual events. It is thus that the study of the logic of relations makes 
                                                 
6 I created this expression to characterize the generalization power of Peirce’s categories, ap-
plied indifferently to man and Nature.  
7 See for instance, BOLER (2004). 
8 See BUCHLER (1939). 
9 See, for an interesting approach to this theme, DILEO (1991).  
10 See also, FORSTER (2011). 
11 Indeed, a realism of classes would only consider closed sets of predicates. Peirce´s latter 
synechistic realism will take into account the possible logic-ontological relations among such 
classes, considering these relations as continuous systems. 
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Peirce reformulate more widely the question of universals, which then assumes 
the form: «Are any continua real?»12. 
It is important to emphasize again that the final formulation of his sys-
tem of Categories and the definitive introduction of Phenomenology in his 
Classification of Sciences13, provide consistency to the Peircean project of con-
ceiving a wide-ranging theory of the Real, a theory of the Object, which he 
calls «Scientific Metaphysics»14. This consistency comprises two fundamental 
axes, namely, Realism and Objective Idealism, as totally correlate and mutually 
necessary doctrines.  
 
1.2  Reality and Ideality in Peirce’s Categories 
Peirce’s realism is already effectively described in the phenomenological 
sphere. His proposal to simultaneously include the diversity of Nature and the 
unity of the qualities of feeling under the first category, already conceives them 
in a relation of categorial symmetry; i.e., as identical modes of appearing that heur-
istically suggest15 that they are under the same mode of being. The attempt of log-
ical conciliation between appearing and being is already a realistic attitude, in 
my view. This conciliation will imply admitting a substantial connaturality, 
namely, a common substantial ideality. Indeed, what links diversity and unity is 
logical possibility. This common logic character permeates external and internal 
world alike. By doing so, Peirce brings something new to philosophy, some-
thing that is found only in Schelling: the explicit attribution of the classical 
concept of freedom to both objectivity and subjectivity, which will solve, with 
a plausible solution, aporias that plagued us for centuries: indeed, only the shar-
ing of logical possibilities could promote it. 
How is this symmetry outlined in the second Peircean category? How 
can one find this experience of reaction, both in the external and internal 
world? How can the particularity of reaction be interior? In other words, how 
can this supposed symmetry be maintained in the realm of secondness16? 
Indeed, Peirce affirms that the phenomenon of reaction against our 
consciousness is also ubiquitous, perhaps the most universal among them. It is 
the source of our entire notion of otherness and polarity, where one of these 
poles comprises the subject in determining its individuality: the consciousness 
of oneself derives immediately from the consciousness of another. This concep-
tual consideration has precedents in the history of philosophy, for example, in 
the second principle of Fichte’s Doctrine of Science, where this determination of 
individuality occurs through the experience of the reaction of a non-ego to an 
ego.  
Despite Peirce’s disdain for Fichte’s extreme nominalism, a more atten-
tive reading of the Doctrine of Science could have made him appreciate the anti-
Cartesian thesis present in its three principles, where the determination of the 
                                                 
12 NEM: 4, p.343. 
13 Kent’s excellent work (1987) on Peirce’s classification of sciences is already a classic.  
14 See DELANEY (2002). 
15 «Suggest» here is to be taken as an adequate term in the realm of Phenomenology. Peirce 
insists that this science is not categorical in its propositions. But its conjectural nature that 
characterizes it as «the first science of philosophy» makes it abductively suggestive for a later 
theory of the Real. 
16 See, for other perspectives, JACQUES (1992) and also MAYORGA (2007).   
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ego does not mediately derive from a Cogito, but rather has an experiential, phe-
nomenological origin through its interaction with the non-ego17. 
It is interesting to see how Peirce, notwithstanding his realism, does not 
seem to realize that it implies what I will call categorial symmetry — the undiffe-
rentiated validity of the three categories to the subjective and the objective 
world. Peirce’s analysis of an internal non-ego as a kind of otherness resident 
in the interior world, represented by the past that contains our experienced 
facticity, provides this internal non-ego with the same property that the ex-
ternal objects have, namely, to react against consciousness. As Peirce puts it: 
 
If you complain to the Past that it is wrong and unreasonable, it laughs. 
It does not care a snap of the finger for Reason. Its force is brute 
force18. […] for the past contains only a certain collection of such cases 
that have occurred […]19. The past consists of the sum of faits accomplis 
[…]. For the Past really acts upon us [….] precisely as an Existent ob-
ject acts20. 
 
Thus, secondness symmetrizes a class of phenomena that permeate ex-
ternal and internal worlds, undifferentiatedly, in their form21. This symmetry is 
only logically feasible through the admission of the connaturality of the objects 
belonging to the internal and external worlds. 
Finally, and perhaps more easily understandable, the symmetry inherent 
in the third category comes in the form of the Laws of Nature in the external 
world, and of positively judicative thought in the inner world. In fact, this no-
tion of internal and external world has two prisms through which they can be 
seen, namely, having as reference the subject of experience, or having in mind 
the categorial nature of these worlds. In other words, natural law is external to 
consciousness, while thought is internal. However, under the second prism, 
natural laws are of an interior nature, without necessarily implying that this 
interior belongs to some transcendence. It is only of a logical nature and, evid-
ently, metaphysical. One could, also, logically define internal nature as that 
which can only be known when it becomes external, namely, by the way in 
which it becomes a phenomenon. Internal nature, under this logical approach, 
always possesses modal generality, containing both Firstness and Thirdness: 
the former as possibility and the latter as necessity. Under this approach, then, 
the logical nature of Secondness is being external. It reveals what is naturally 
internal, as freedom and order. All phenomena are governed by Chance and by 
Law and, thus appear partially ordered or, to put it differently, partially ran-
dom. 
This viewpoint, which refuses the splitting between external and inter-
nal worlds and that, contrarily, places them in a continuum, nevertheless, does 
                                                 
17 See AA I, 2 262 and AA 1, 2 266 in FICHTE (1964).  
18 CP: 2.84, c. 1902. 
19 CP: 2.148, c. 1902. 
20 EP2: 357. 
21 This subject indeed suggests a future discussion that goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
This internal facticity, and its generalization of conscious and mainly unconscious symbolic 
structure, constitute the dynamic object of psychoanalysis, whose specificity is evidenced in 
each subject-patient. 
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not impede them from being distinguished without, however, separating them 
substantially as strangers to each other. Such viewpoint, on the contrary, con-
stitutes a gateway to a more general approach to the Peircean realism-idealism. 
As long as metaphysics is grounded in logic, the clouds of dogmatism are dis-
pelled and one can navigate heuristically through the theoretical possibilities of 
the explanation of phenomena. 
It must also be stressed that the deepest understanding of Peirce’s cate-
gories, the reason for introducing them, their consequences, their ontological 
overlapping, in short, their meaning vis-à-vis the totality of the theoretical sys-
tem of Peirce’s philosophy, can only be gained when one considers his cos-
mology. In particular, in the cosmogenesis, the continuum from which the uni-
verse emerges lies the birth of the categories, which emerge in the sequence of 
first, second, and third. This Peircean proposition enables us to see how the cat-
egory of secondness arose from Firstness, and how Thirdness arose from se-
condness. In turn, Firstness has genesis in a germinal Nothing, perhaps one of 
the most interesting points of Peircean writings, spurring speculation on the 
nature itself of this Nothing22. 
To enlarge upon these reflections will require an entire essay, all of it-
self. Hence, I here confine myself to observing the significance of Peirce’s real-
ism and idealism. 
 
1.3  Concerning a Synthesis of the Categories 
From the point of view of metaphysics, the third category of the triad, Third-
ness, constitutes the mode of being of the Laws of nature represented, under 
these terms, as real mediation between Chance and Existence and comprising, 
in this order, the real modes of being of Firstness and Secondness. The propo-
sition of the categories within Phenomenology, by describing the modes of 
being of our human experience, already proclaims, as mentioned, the rupture 
of the subject-object dualism, since thought and natural law are formal corre-
lates in the realm of Thirdness, similar to freedom, unity of consciousness and 
Chance, under Firstness, and otherness and existence, under Secondness. To 
make logically possible the categorically homogeneous subsumption of subjec-
tivity and objectivity, the starting point of Peirce’s philosophy will have to re-
fute, as emphasized, a mind-matter dualism, opting for a monism, on which I 
will comment later. Nevertheless, it is important to show how, from the point 
of view of categorical homogeneity, such monism is necessary, rejecting inter-
pretations that, from a tacit viewpoint of a Cartesian dualism, seek unsuccess-
fully some kind of consistency between realist and idealist positions, both un-
derstood in a contemporary way, namely, as opposite doctrines. 
Distinguishing reality from existence, like the scholastics, Peirce con-
ceptualizes reality as the locus of ontological generality or, more precisely, of 
ontologically continuous systems in the form of the laws of nature23. While 
reality is subsumed in the third category, existence is that mode of being of the 
particular, of the individual, characterized by the interacting duality of forces, 
situated under secondness. The individual materializes, or actualizes, the gen-
erality of the law under the form of a temporally ordered behavior, which is the 
                                                 
22 See, for other perspectives, TURLEY (1977) and also, ESPOSITO (1980). 
23 See, for another approach, MICHAEL (1988). 
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condition of possibility of the predictive nature of thought generally, in prac-
tical life, and of science in particular. Law, under this consideration, contains 
an esse in futuro to which continuity is justly conferred24. 
The Peircean doctrine of Synechism, or theory of the continuum, which 
under its formal aspect is the thesis of the continuity of reality, thus becomes a 
correlate of the author’s25 Realism. It is from within this Realism that Peirce 
will extract one of the supporting points for his Idealism. 
 
1.4 Enhancing Objective Idealism 
Some points on Peirce’s Objective Idealism merit further consideration. Let us 
recall that I consider a mind-matter monism a logical consequence of the cate-
gorial homogeneity of subject and object. Indeed, Peirce refuses, as mentioned 
before, the substantial duality between mind and matter as found in Cartesian 
philosophy, analyzing both alternatives of that monism. On the one hand, a 
materialist monism leads to insoluble questions as regards the category of 
Firstness. As we know, Firstness encompasses the mode of being of the un-
conditioned in the external forms of Chance, and internal forms of the quali-
ties of feeling, which require a point of discontinuity in the continuum of time, 
represented by the present. The complex logical aspect of the relation between 
feeling and unity of consciousness, as characteristics of genetic heuristic states, 
is also fundamental for an understanding and development of his theory of 
Abduction. Under the aspect of Pragmatism, on the other hand, materialist 
monism, through an analysis of its practical consequences, will be also an onto-
logical determinism, unacceptable in Peirce’s epistemological system, as this 
system requires the admissibility of an ontological principle of chance that calls 
for an indeterminism, whether as to reality or as regards the theories that seek 
to represent them26. 
Peirce, then, embraces a monism between mind and matter, in the 
sense of a primarily genealogic eidos, which subsumes matter as mind exhausted 
by inveterate habits. This idea, extracted in full from Schelling’s Philosophy of 
Nature27, proposes a grading of life to the conception of mind. In fact, mind, 
conceived monistically by incorporating matter as one specialized phenom-
enon, will be permeated at its higher stages by more intense grades of random-
ness, due to the marked presence of Firstness in it. This randomness, which 
appears as variety in phenomena, will continuously and vectorially decrease 
from mind to matter, viz., from the generic eidetic character of mind to its 
specialized one, matter. 
Thus, the equivalence between reality and ideality proposed by Schel-
ling is fully adopted in Peirce’s philosophy. I refer, evidently, to an Objective 
                                                 
24 See also, MOORE (1968).  
25 In this respect, in a passage of his work, Peirce states: «When we come to study the principle 
of continuity we will gain a more ontological conception of knowledge and reality» (CP: 4.62, 
1893). 
26 See for other perspectives, COSCULLUELA (1992) and also, BRAKEL (1994). 
27 Schelling claimed in his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800): «Matter is indeed, nothing else 
than mind viewed in an equilibrium of its activities. There is no need to demonstrate at length 
how, by means of this elimination of all dualism, or all real opposition between mind and mat-
ter, whereby the latter is regarded merely as mind under a condition of dullness, or the former, 
conversely, as matter merely in becoming […]». 
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Idealism that, in this way, is not confined solely to the ideality of the subject, 
once the Cartesian mind-matter dichotomy is overcome28. 
 
1.5 Further observations on the overlapping of reality and ideality in Peirce’s philosophy 
Emphasis must, once more, be placed on the fact that Peirce’s Idealism has 
already presented its credentials in the formulation of his Realism. Indeed, to 
assume the symmetry of the category of Thirdness for thought and law pre-
sumes an eidetic connaturality for both or, in other words, which the texture of 
thought is possibly the same from the logically objective way of ordering of 
individuals in secondness. Here, again, there is a cosmological evolutionism 
whose intrinsic temporality places the human mind, gradually formed in light 
of a logic inherent in Nature, harmonizing a formal homology between reality 
and thought. Peirce also insists that the phenomenon of intelligibility of Nature 
by science deserves serious consideration as support to the idealist thesis. 
Idealism, thus, to my mind, has substantiality in the mind-matter monism and 
formality in Realism, with substantiality as the genealogic backdrop of formal-
ity, as the author’s cosmogenesis will reveal, through ontology29. This is none 
other than the background of the genetic vagueness of form in the realm of 
innerness. The growth of the representative form follows the vaguely defined 
vector that, according to Peirce, is the very sense of all the logic in his positivi-
ty. 
It must also be stressed that the substantial identity between ideality 
and reality is the adequate theoretical environment for a correct interpretation 
not only of ontology, but also of Peirce’s epistemology. This identity, as we 
here already stressed, ensures annulment of the polarities that generate es-
trangement between subject and object.  
In my view, when taken in their sense of existence or not of external 
things, realism and idealism are, in effect, irreconcilable30. Exemplarily, a radical 
subjective idealism in the style of Fichte or Berkeley, denies the existence of an 
external world independently of consciousness. The realism of «external 
things», in turn, assumes, when seen in the light of the realism of Peirce’s con-
tinua, the same antagonistic stance of a nominalism that confines, similarly, 
generality only as property of language. This bipolar dichotomy between ideal-
ism and realism, already classical in post-Cartesian philosophy, is characterized 
by a duality between nominalist doctrines of different garbs under the Peircean 
view, and this focus has steered the interpretation of the majority of commen-
taries on the works of Peirce. The lack of focus on the real context of the au-





                                                 
28 For an entirely different perspective see, SHORT (2010a). 
29 Peirce’s Cosmogenesis, by totally initiating on the sphere of an eidetic unity, is considered an 
extravagant line of thought by some commentators, such as APEL (1981), p.156-157 and 
GALLIE (1975), p. 216. 
30 This kind of consideration on the issue appears in classic commentators of Peirce, such as 
ALMEDER (1980). 
31 See also GUARDIANO (2011) and DILWORTH (2011).  
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1.6 Some Important Consequences of Peirce’s Realism-Idealism 
There are countless epistemological consequences resulting from Peirce’s real-
ism-idealism. On the one hand, induction is confirmed as a logical figure, 
without the encumbrances caused by the indemonstrability of the reality of the 
laws. Indeed, Peirce does not seek a full demonstration of this reality: he as-
sumes it as a condition of possibility for positive thought in general and predic-
tive thought in particular, under his Fallibilism and Evolutionism. On the other 
hand, the homogeneity of the categories as to interiority and exteriority pre-
vents one from setting a residue of incognizable world epistemologically 
against any representation. Under this viewpoint, the limits of cognizability are 
rightfully replaced by the limits of certainty — this clause deriving, first of all, 
from the combination of its objective idealism with its ontological indetermin-
ism. 
Still in the realm of a heuristic logic of discovery, there are notable con-
sequences from the conception of Firstness, where the connatural eidetic sub-
stantiality between subject and object, assured by Objective Idealism, elicits 
thinking a philosophy that conjectures on the genesis of the theories, a genesis 
that occurs against a backdrop of an absolute freedom of a non-time that is 
evolutionarily incorporated in temporality for the growth of form. 
With a firm reference to the heuristics of Kantian schematicism present 
in the Doctrine of the Method of the 1st Critique, the Peircean analysis of the 
heuristic power of the diagrams32, whose iconicity is not solely confined to the 
level of representation, being capable of being sanctioned as homology in rela-
tion to the reality of positive objects, leads to the unveiling of the form poten-
tially present in the original argument of Abduction33. 
It is equally noteworthy that, within Peircean metaphysics, the human 
faculties of thought, imagination and feeling can display their ontological gen-
esis without resorting to a proscribed theology or to a special science, such as 
psychology that, according to Peirce, has nothing to add to questions placed by 
logic34. 
Nor, within the core Peircean thought, the non- answer will be accepta-
ble for questions of genesis: such incognizability proclaims an epistemic silence 
foreign to the author’s realism-idealism. 
The essay The Law of Mind, in my opinion, supplements a theoretical 
picture that seeks to explain how ideas merge to shape new ideas. What is in 
the very nature of ideas that make them blend to reply heuristically to pheno-
mena that have no credible representation in available theories? The answer to 
this question must first, we think, consider Peirce’s realism-idealism as the ba-
sic metaphysical environment of his philosophy, in which, we presume, an 
understanding of The Law of Mind can be deepened. 
 
                                                 
32 On this specific topic, see IBRI (2006). 
33 See THIBAUD (1975). 
34 See, for example, CP: 2.51, c. 1902. Peirce affirms that some scholars «confound psychic 
truths with psychological truths» (CP: 5.486, 1907). I understand, from the author’s thinking, 
that psychic truth is that taken on the logical plane from phenomena of a psychic nature that may 
categorically support ontological hypotheses. In turn, psychological truth is situated in the seman-
tic sphere of available theoretical models in Psychology, which is knowingly a special science 
that recounts aspects of phenomena subject to investigation. 
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2. Reflections on The Law of Mind 
In 1892, Peirce published in «The Monist» (vol. II, pp. 533–59) the essay The 
Law of Mind 35, investigating the basic guidelines of the conduct of the mind 
and of the ideas developed in it. Actually, Peirce sought elements for his cos-
mology36, linking his research to his doctrine of synechism, and using the con-
cept of continuum in the flow of ideas that group to form more general ideas. 
According to Peirce, the law of mind is fundamentally designed as follows: 
 
Logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but 
one law of mind, namely, that ideas tend to spread continuously and to 
affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affec-
tability. In this spreading they lose intensity, and especially the power of 
affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with the other 
ideas37. 
 
We have here a near-inevitable invitation to reflect on the dual sense of 
the word affect meaning, on the one hand, influencing and, on the other, loving. 
I call your attention to this dual meaning leaving, for the time being, the ana-
lysis of its possible consequences to be discussed farther along this paper. Let 
us see the development of Peirce’s thought in that essay. As regards the con-
tinuum of ideas, he places the following question: 
 
We have here before us a question of difficulty, analogous to the ques-
tion of nominalism and realism. But when once it has been clearly for-
mulated, logic leaves room for one answer only. How can a past idea be 
present? Can it be present vicariously? To a certain extent, perhaps; but 
not merely so; for then the question would arise how the past idea can 
be related to its vicarious representation. The relation, being between 
Ideas, can only exist in some consciousness: now that past idea was in 
no consciousness but that past consciousness that alone contained it; 
and that did not embrace the vicarious idea. Some minds will here jump 
to the conclusion that a past idea cannot in any sense be present. But 
that is hasty and illogical. How extravagant, too, to pronounce our 
whole knowledge of the past to be mere delusion! Yet it would seem 
that the past is as completely beyond the bonds of possible experience 
as a Kantian thing-in-itself38. 
 
Evidently Peirce is asking a question with clear reference to synechism, 
namely, his doctrine of the continuum39. In other words, he affirms that the link 
between ideas constitutes a consciousness of continuity. A past idea will not be 
in this consciousness availing itself of a substitution, but rather because of an 
                                                 
35 EP1: 312-333. OCHS (1991) draws an interesting historical retrospect on the emergence of 
this essay. 
36 EP1: 313. 
37 EP1: 313; emphasis added. 
38 EP1: 314. See, also, the excellent analysis of the stages of consciousness in Peircean philo-
sophy in HOUSER (1983). 
39 See ZALAMEA (2012) and also BUCKLEY (2012). 
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actual occurrence, i.e., this idea is present and ipso facto must be present40. 
Thus, time, which underlies consciousness, must ensure that the present is 
linked to the past by a series of real infinitesimal steps41. The continuum of con-
sciousness must cover a lapse of time in which we are immediately conscious. 
It is not only continuous in the subjective sense, but also, as it is immediate 
during that infinitesimal interval of time, its object is, likewise, continuous42. 
The feeling of continuity of consciousness is, simultaneously, the direct percep-
tion43 of the continuity of its content. In other words, Peirce tries to relate the 
propagation or expansion of consciousness in an interval of time during which 
it remains as such, to a systemic expansion or propagation of the ideas that 
make up its object within that consciousness. According to the author’s idealist 
realism, not only time but also space is continuous in itself as a real entity, and 
the objective relations that occur in both are of the nature of ideas within sub-
jectivity. The continuum of consciousness, during a time period that does not 
exclusively have the dimension of interior sense, or state of possibility of ap-
perception, as Kant makes of it, correlates to the continuity of ideas that have, 
in the real object, the assurance of this continuum. The question placed by the 
author, therefore, seems to convey an exclusive condition of time; if the real 
object is present before the mind, it is present with its relations that may be 
perceived by a consciousness. However, being before a mind is a spatial simul-
taneity between subject and object, since real relation is only revealed in an 
objective succession of instances, whose duration is the same for the con-
sciousness that perceives. The ideas of an immediately past instant link them-
selves with the present idea in a natural succession. It is at this point that the 
mind must possess a criterion of relevance to identify the objective relations in 
representation; without it, there is no doubt that the apprehension of empiria is 
blind. However, it is when this spatial coincidence between subject and object 
occurs partially or, even, does not occur, that present ideas—in the face of a 
particular real object that relates to others that are not there, or in the face of 
the content of past experiences—associate themselves and amplify themselves 
in a system that holds not only the continuity of time, but also the continuum 
itself of its real reference. The Peircean question is, above all, how this occurs: 
what underlies the connection of ideas that is implemented as new knowledge? 
It is quite true that this question may have acceptable answers within idealist 
realism, which derives the human mind from the mind of Nature; for this very 
reason, that question of genesis is also a question of heuristics. 
According to Peirce, the connection of ideas produces more general 
ideas, in an amplificatory process that consummates in an immediately present 
live feeling44. In this idea of live feeling there is, in fact, a referral to the Peir-
cean concept of quale-consciousness, which is fundamentally a single quality, 
and this unity is basic for the development of conceptual thought. This is not 
                                                 
40 EP1: 314. 
41 Ibidem. 
42 EP1: 315. ALBORN (1989) provides an interesting approach to Peirce’s ontological syne-
chism, through the solution that he gives to Zenon’s paradox. 
43 Peirce has a complex theory of perception. The use of the word perception and its derivatives 
here refers only to its common-language meaning. For a study of the theme, see HAUSMAN 
(2005).  
44 EP1: 325. 
 Ivo Assad Ibri, The Heuristic Power of Agapism in Peirce’s Philosophy 
 




the Kantian unity of apperception. It relates much more to the consciousness 
of the Schellingian infinite where the self is an absolute indetermination, that is, 
a depersonalization of consciousness that follows the feeling of unity. Under a 
Peircean viewpoint, quale-consciousness, as he calls it45, is a consciousness 
absolutely present in its unity. The feeling, then, of this unity is a live feeling; it 
is what accompanies the unity of an idea complexified by the addition of oth-
ers. This more general idea does not break that primary unity of quale-
consciousness, since all component ideas are absolutely present in an interval 
of time in which such consciousness occurs. In this complex idea, there is also, 
in fact, a system of correlate ideas, an individual quality that derives from its 
systemic unity shown in the simultaneousness of that consciousness. This idea, 
therefore, cannot be perceived as mediation when it presents itself to the mind; 
the idea as such would require the presence of a second, its object, which 
would be distinct from it for that consciousness. Heuristically, however, as it is 
a new idea that arouses a live feeling of unity46, it must be, in itself, mediation, 
whether for a real object or for an object that it, itself, built; in this latter case, 
the object is only a referent for it47. In any case, that new idea does not have its 
liveliness because of its own independent quality, but because it presents itself 
as a solution for a novel problem; its unity and quality are due to its lack of 
differentiation with the object that is no longer other for consciousness. In the 
realm of eidetic connaturality of the object with the mind, this lack of differen-
tiation, on the one hand, cannot be considered strange and, on the other hand, 
mediation, as such, plays the role of breaking the brute force of mere second-
ness, which appears thus when thought has not extracted from it the ideality 
that makes it reducible to a predictive concept. 
To the questions placed by Peirce in The Law of Mind, these considera-
tions do not, as yet, provide an answer, but they add that a new concept, under 
the tendency of growth of the mind, requires a focus on the object in its spa-
tio-temporal relationship with consciousness, and that the presence of the 
former in the latter does not break its intrinsic primary unity. I borrow Schel-
ling’s concept of eidetic unity temporarily, although Peirce has his own concep-
tualization, which, incidentally, does not conflict with Schelling’s; nevertheless, 
new elements can be perceived in this concept, deriving from Peircean cos-
mology.  
However, before resuming Peirce’s essay, let us recall some points of 
this idea of unity of consciousness already expounded in a previous paper. 
What we have to stress is that quale-consciousness is a continuous quality of 
feeling that is undifferentiated from consciousness in itself. Besides this central 
aspect of its characterization, it is absolutely separated from time and, for this 
reason, it is a consciousness of full presentness, unconnected with the flow of 
temporality, due to its unconditionality; it neither originates from the past nor 
                                                 
45 See, for example, CP: 6.222-230, 1898. 
46 It is based on this idea of life present in feeling that we assume that it is not of the nature of a 
habit. Habit, in the form of a concept, either conscious or unconscious, does not arouse this 
quality of liveliness in consciousness. 
47 Incidentally, the word mediation applies, for the sake of conceptual strictness, as third in 
face of real otherness. Thus, when the object is built inside representation, there is no objective 
mediation, but only a subjective one, making the word a mere extension of the concept. 
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intends something for the future: «the now is one and but one»48. Thus, this 
state of consciousness is a continuum of possibilities; from it nothing necessary 
can be derived. It is, then, an indefinite feeling of freedom that occurs in an 
interior hiatus of time. But, the ontological expression of this phenomenon of 
interiority is precisely that principle of randomness in exteriority that Peirce 
calls Absolute Chance, responsible for the variety and spontaneity of nature: 
 
That very same logical element of experience, the quale-element, which 
appears upon the inside as unity, when viewed from the outside is seen 
as variety49; [and] Wherever chance-spontaneity is found, there, in the 
same proportion, feeling exists. In fact, chance is but the outward as-
pect of that which within itself is feeling50. 
 
In the Peircean cosmogenesis, the beginning of the universe occurred 
with a chaos of depersonalized feelings derived from the unity of a continuum 
of unlimited possibilities, of the nature of a quale-consciousness. In the context 
of Peirce’s objective idealism, the beginning of the universe is absolutely eidet-
ic, in which that quale-consciousness assumes an ontological status. Within the 
realm of his philosophy, therefore, the objective identity flows naturally be-
tween the spontaneities of chance and feeling, as evidenced in this last passage 
of his work. Let us, at this point, recall Schelling, to whom the very substance 
of aesthetic intuition is that multiplicity and variety that immediately reflect life 
in Nature. It is, in fact, the vision of «relative idealism»51 that restricts the eidet-
ic nature of feeling within subjective interiority, and certainly has no clear an-
swer for the fact of strange and dead matter arousing live feelings in that inte-
riority. As regards this point, Objective Idealism seems comfortably positioned 
for an answer: 
 
I am bound to maintain that an idea can only be affected by an idea in 
continuous connection with it. By anything but an idea, it cannot be af-
fected at all. This obliges me to say, as I do say, on other grounds, that 
what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hide-
bound with habits. It still retains the element of diversification; and in 




People wonder, too, how dead matter can excite feelings in the mind 
[…]. I prefer to guess that it is a psychic feeling of red without us 
which arouses a sympathetic feeling of red in our senses53. 
 
                                                 
48 CP: 6.231, 1898. 
49 CP: 6.236, 1898.  
50 EP1: 348. 
51 This Schellingean expression, relative idealism, is characterized by «only one of the sides which, 
without the other, is unthinkable» (SCHELLING, 1988, p. 51). 
52 EP1: 331. 
53 CP: 1.311, 1905. Here the term «sympathetic» does not mean a quality of feeling itself, but 
the Idea of cosmic sympathy contained in the original Greek sympátheia. 
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This blend of spontaneity, quality, diversity, chance, unity of feeling, 
life and growth occurs as a predication of the primordial eidos, which is the all-
pervading cosmic substratum, not differentiating, in this context, between exte-
riority and interiority. Within the realm of these considerations, Peirce discards 
any physical origin for the unity of consciousness: 
 
The brain shows no central cell. The unity of consciousness is therefore 
not of physiological origin. It can only be metaphysical. So far as feel-
ings have any continuity, it is the metaphysical nature of feeling to have 
a unity54. 
 
The homogenesis between chance and unity of consciousness, as a re-
demption of cosmology, becomes elemental to the law of mind. To admit that 
ideas gather, forming more general ideas through a necessary rule, characterizes 
a mechanical determinism inadequate for Peircean philosophy. Thus, there 
should be some element of freedom and spontaneity responsible for bringing 
the ideas together in the mind. Let us see this further passage of The Law of 
Mind: 
 
Certainly, I cannot see how anyone can deny that the infinite diversity 
of the universe, which we call chance, may bring ideas into proximity 
which are not associated in one general idea. It may do this many times. 
But then the law of continuous spreading will produce a mental associ-
ation; and this I suppose is an abridged statement of the way the uni-
verse has been evolved55. 
 
Clearly, we must understand this law of expansion in the light of the 
concepts of continuity and growth. As yet, however, there is no solution for 
the dual meaning of the word affect. In short, how does that law promote this 
interaction between ideas? Although the mode of growth and continuity that 
weaves ideas in the human mind and in the universe as a whole is the same 
under an evolutionary trend, there still seems to be lacking an element that can 
encourage that generalizing interaction. So far, we know that an element of 
objective freedom brings ideas closer, and that they get together because that is 
the law of evolution that permeates the interior and exterior worlds. However, 
how this association occurs requires, in my view, a study of the modes of evolu-
tion in Peirce’s thought. 
 
2.1 Peirce’s Evolutionism: Agapism as Deepest Heuristic Fabric 
In the essay Evolutionary Love56, published in 1893 in «The Monist» (Vol.3, pp. 
176-200), Peirce examines the evolutionary theories that prevailed until then 
                                                 
54 CP: 6.229, 1898. In ECCLES (1977), pp. 361-370, there is an exposition of some theories on 
possible neurological causes of the unity of consciousness, totally rejected by the author for 
lack of scientific evidence. His own hypothesis rejects a physiological origin: «the experience of 
unity of consciousness is provided by a self-conscious mind (sic) and not by the neural machinery 
of the liaison areas of the cerebral hemisphere» (p. 362). 
55 EP1: 327. The evolution of the universe, in Peirce’s view, occurs in the direction of the 
growth of thirdness, the category of the general ideas, considered, however, as a mode of being 
of ontological ground. 
56 CP: 6.272-317, c. 1893. 
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and, while not refuting them, affirms that none effectively accounts for the 
wholeness of the evolution of the universe. His analysis focuses on the scheme of 
his three categories finding, in fact, that those theories do not meet his re-
quirements, which are basically the same as those of his cosmology. Let us then 
move on to the study that the author makes of the evolutionary theories, start-
ing with his view of Darwinism: 
 
Let us try to define the logical affinities of the different theories of evo-
lution. Natural selection, as conceived by Darwin, is a mode of evolu-
tion in which the only positive agent of change in the whole passage 
from moner to man is fortuitous variation. To secure advance in a def-
inite direction chance has to be seconded by some action that shall 
hinder the propagation of some varieties or stimulate that of others. In 
natural selection, strictly so called, it is the crowding out of the weak57. 
 
Apropos of this passage, it should be noted that Peirce criticized the 
unwarranted generalizations of Darwin’s theory during the nineteenth century, 
to the extent of saying that the then emerging political economy58, wrongfully 
inspired by the notion of natural selection, legitimized the spirit of individual 
competition, in which the strongest is better adapted to the contingencies of 
reality and, so, overwhelms the weakest. Absolutely opposed to all forms of 
individualism, Peirce gave the epithet of «gospel of greed»59 to the science that 
proclaimed this type of conduct. On the Darwin theory the author adds: 
 
The Origin of Species was published toward the end of the year 1859. The 
preceding years since 1846 had been one of the most productive sea-
sons, —or if extended so as to cover the great book we are considering, 
the most productive period of equal length in the entire history of 
science from its beginnings until now. The idea that chance begets or-
der, which is one of the corner-stones of modern physics (although Dr. 
Carus considers it ―the weakest point in Mr. Peirce's system‖) was at 
that time put into its clearest light60. 
 
Peirce equally comments on the favorable reception Darwin’s work 
met owing to its ideas being those toward which the age was favorably dis-
posed61. The author then examines the necessitarian theory of evolution. 
 
Diametrically opposed to evolution by chance, are those theories which 
attribute all progress to an inward necessary principle, or other forms 
                                                 
57 EP1: 358. 
58 EP1: 354. 
59 EP1: 357. Peirce is ironic when commenting on the acceptance of the hardness of theories, 
such as utilitarianism, allied to individualism: «anaesthetics had been in use for thirteen years. 
Already, people’s acquaintance with suffering had dropped off very much; and as a conse-
quence, that unlovely hardness, by which our times are so contrasted with those that imme-
diately preceded them, had already set it, and inclined people to relish a ruthless theory» (EP1: 
358). 
60 Ibidem. The reference is to Paul Carus, then editor of «The Monist» and opponent of Peirce 
on this issue. 
61 EP1: 358. 
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of necessity. Many naturalists have thought that if an egg is destined to 
go through a certain series of embryological transformations, from 
which it is perfectly certain not to deviate, and if in geological time al-
most exactly the same forms appear successively, one replacing another 
in the same order, the strong presumption is that this latter succession 
was as predeterminate and certain to take place as the former62. 
 
Peirce goes on to show that even the geosciences had supporters along 
this line of evolution:  
 
Those geologists who think that the variation of species is due to cata-
clysmic alterations of climate or of the chemical constitution of the air 
and water are also making mechanical necessity chief factor of evolu-
tion63. 
 
Clearly antagonistic, the necessitarist theory and the Darwinist doctrine 
are confronted with Lamarck’s evolutionist theory, which, according to Peirce, 
consists in «evolution by the force of habit»64. Habit, however, is essentially an 
attribute of the mind that involves the idea of growth and generalization and 
reveals, in Peirce’s view, a dual aspect: on the one hand it establishes new 
structural features of conduct and, on the other, brings them in «harmony with 
the general morphology and function of the animals and plants to which they 
belong»65. Peirce saw in Lamarckian theory an idea of endeavor toward the de-
velopment of growth, and  
 
endeavor, since it is directed toward an end, is essentially psychical, 
even though it be sometimes unconscious; and the growth due to exer-
cise [...] follows a law of a character quite contrary to that of mechan-
ics66. 
 
It is from the analysis of these theories and from the idea of a tendency 
toward the expansion of that basic substratum of a mental nature, blending 
their elements in a continuum, that the author recognizes the need for three 
forms of evolution, which must admit the Darwinist and necessitarist theories 
and, simultaneously, amplify aspects of the Lamarckian theory. Bearing in mind 
the concept of harmony, Peirce sought a higher, solidifying, principle of evolu-
tion, to gather analogous elements, stimulating that continuous expansion to-
ward growth. As extraordinary as it may seem to the author’s readers, it is from 
St. John’s Gospel that the author sought this evolutionary principle, substan-
tiated in the idea of Love: 
 
Everybody can see that the statement of St. John is the formula of an 
evolutionary philosophy, which teaches that growth comes only from 
love, from — I will not say self-sacrifice, but from the ardent impulse to 
                                                 
62 EP1: 359. 
63 Ibidem. 
64 EP1: 360. 
65 Ibidem. 
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fulfill another's highest impulse. Suppose, for example, that I have an 
idea that interests me. It is my creation. It is my creature; for as shown 
in last July's Monist, it is a little person. I love it; and I will sink myself in 
perfecting it. It is not by dealing out cold justice to the circle of my 
ideas that I can make them grow, but by cherishing and tending them 
as I would the flowers in my garden. The philosophy we draw from 
John's gospel is that this is the way mind develops; and as for the cos-
mos, only so far as it yet is mind, and so has life, is it capable of further 
evolution. Love, recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradual-
ly warms it into life, and makes it lovely. That is the sort of evolution 
which every careful student of my essay ―The Law of Mind‖ must see 
that synechism calls for67. 
 
As a philosophical matter of the ancient Greeks and theological meta-
physics, a contemporary resumption of the cosmic principle of Love could be 
predicated as exotic by offering, again, the unstable ground for a possible an-
thropomorphism. Totally immune to accusations of anthropomorphism68, the 
legitimate Peircean philosophy, like that of Schelling, explores all the attributes 
of the universe of the mind under its primordiality, which is established by 
Objective Idealism: matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical 
laws. Indeed, the view of Love as a greater substratum of evolution is due to a 
systemic theoretical structure that permeates not only the author’s ontology, 
but also his entire philosophy. The only way this structure can be apprehended 
is by avoiding fragmented readings of his work. Further, it must be considered 
that such concept, in the realm of Peircean philosophy, is nevertheless the key 
for the solution of the semantic duality of the word affect, which, as we have 
said, has in love a possible sense. 
Therefore, three modes of evolution must, somehow, harmonize with 
the three Peircean categories: 
 
Three modes of evolution have thus been brought before us; evolution 
by fortuitous variation, evolution by mechanical necessity, and evolu-
tion by creative love. We may term them tychastic evolution, or tychasm, 
anancastic evolution, or anancasm, and agapastic evolution, or agapasm. The 
doctrines which represent these as severally of principal importance we 
may term tychasticism, anancasticism, and agapasticism. On the other hand 
the mere propositions that absolute chance, mechanical necessity, and 
the law of love are severally operative in the cosmos may receive the 
names of tychism, ananchism, and agapism69. 
 
Thus, tychasticism is associated with the first Peircean category of first-
ness; anancasticism, as rule of mechanical necessity, with secondness, leaving 
agapasticism linked to thirdness, which, as we recall, plays the role of mediator, 
generalizer, and reducer of the brute force of the particular to the unity of a 
cosmic continuum that does not differentiate between interiority and exteriori-
ty in the modes of law and thought. In its agglutinative and continuous nature, 
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agapism is a principle that conciliates oppositions that have an inherent basic 
unity ensuring their connaturality, like the ideal-real unity in Schelling’s philos-
ophy: «love cannot have a contrary, but must embrace what is most opposed to 
it»70. 
Strictly on the plane that concerns us, represented by how ideas asso-
ciate themselves, we already know that the act of chance plays the role of freely 
bringing them closer. It seems, however, that there is also, in ananchism, 
another dimension of the word affect, not only that of affection enclosed in the 
idea of agapism, but also that of necessary interaction, whether by affinity or 
logical opposition. In this case, the meaning of that word could be to affect by 
linking an antecedent to a consequent or, even, denying a consequent by logical 
opposition. It should be stressed that logical necessity is in the interior of the 
third category as a mode of operation of the law in secondness. It should be 
emphasized, however, that association of ideas has a genealogical sense, i.e., it 
refers to a mode of formation. As such, it is not surprising that the mode of evolu-
tionary formation out of necessity, defined by the author as ananchism, is linked 
to the second and not to the third category. That dual semantic dimension of 
the word affect, thus, seems to satisfy agapism and ananchism from the freedom 
and spontaneity with which tychism brings ideas closer. It is from this approx-
imation that the other two modes of eidetic association act, in which the prin-
ciple of love effectively plays a heuristic role which, according to the author, 
presents itself in three aspects: 
 
The agapastic development of thought is the adoption of certain men-
tal tendencies, not altogether heedlessly, as in tychasm, nor quite blindly 
by the mere force of circumstances or of logic, as in ananchasm, but by 
an immediate attraction for the idea itself, whose nature is divined be-
fore the mind possesses it, by the power of sympathy, that is, by virtue of 
the continuity of mind; and this mental tendency may be of three vari-
eties, as follows. First, it may affect a whole people or community in its 
collective personality, and be thence communicated to such individuals 
as are in powerfully sympathetic connection with the collective people, 
although they may be intellectually incapable of attaining the idea by 
their private understandings or even perhaps of consciously apprehend-
ing it71. 
 
This passage highlights the ideas of sympathy, which we have already 
emphasized, and of community, which, incidentally, are associated with the 
concepts of reality and truth within Peircean philosophy72. Continuing this 
paragraph, Peirce states: 
 
Second, it may affect a private person directly, yet so that he is only 
enabled to apprehend the idea, or to appreciate its attractiveness, by 
virtue of his sympathy with his neighbors, under the influence of a 
striking experience or development of thought. The conversion of St. 
                                                 
70 Ibidem. 
71 EP1: 364; my italics. 
72 The overlapping of these last three concepts not being an object of this paper may be veri-
fied by the reader in Peirce’s works W2: 238-239; W2: 241; W2: 251-252 and W2: 271. 
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Paul may be taken as an example of what is meant. Third, it may affect 
an individual, independently of his human affections, by virtue of an at-
traction it exercises upon his mind, even before he has comprehended 
it. This is the phenomenon which has been well called the divination of 
genius; for it is due to the continuity between the man’s mind and the 
Most High73. 
 
Evidently, in these three modes analyzed by Peirce, there is a tacit ref-
erence to ideas that represent a development of the mind, an advance of its 
production, a growth of its knowledge. There is, first of all, freedom permeat-
ing this heuristic activity of the mind, in an evident denial that there can geneti-
cally occur some rule of deductive structure that could provide the emergence 
of that which is, actually, new in the universe of ideality. Despite this genealog-
ical freedom, the evolution of human thought cannot be attributed solely to 
random factors, as in the interior of tychism. According to Peirce, the proofs 
of agapism and synechism are engraved in history as spirits of an age74 in which 
an entire community blends to boost human culture75. 
 
3. Some Important Points as Conclusion 
The agapism that I try to show here represents a fundamental principle on the 
structure of the universe, which correlates with Peirce’s heuristics. This heurist-
ics not only runs parallel to our modes of conjecture, of finding true represen-
tations, but also to its more general plan, namely, the formation and growth of 
thirdness as a whole, as a tendency of the Universe. This consequence is asso-
ciated by commentators of Peirce’s work to objective idealism, a lesser-
mentioned doctrine, which affirms that there is only one primordial substance 
in the universe, ideality, an eidetic substratum that makes matter a form of spe-
cial eidos, turning its laws of physical nature into special cases of mental laws, 
viz., observable in the psychic realm. The author’s synechism is associated with 
this idealism, certifying that one must fundamentally suppose continuities in 
Nature and, additionally, continuity between mind and matter, an essential the-
sis of that same idealism. These doctrines, thus, create a backdrop for an un-
derstanding of the author’s realism in its true conception and dimension, with-
out any theoretical opposition to idealism as, incidentally, some commentators 
of the author’s work suppose. Both claim that something of the nature of 
ideality is essential in the universe: realism affirms the reality of the continua, or 
ultimately, the reality of thirdness; idealism ensures the eidetic nature of all 
continuity and creates the substantial environment where realism can be.  
The transit of the signs between subject and object is now legitimized 
within this ambiance, providing a realistic and idealistic range for Semiotics. To 
try grounding it solely as a science of forms that precedes all possible ontology 
is, to my mind, to resort to an illicit resource within the Peircean philosophical 
system, in a kind of tacit transcendentalism76, which ignores the fact that, in the 
                                                 
73 Ibidem. 
74 EP1: 365 and 369. 
75 One can find other approaches to the issues we address in this chapter in, CHRISTIANSEN 
(2002).; FINKELSTEIN (1994); HOOKWAY (1997); REYNOLDS (2002); SHORT (2010b); 
VENTIMIGLIA (2008); and TURLEY (1977).  
76 As advocated by APEL (1980-1982). 
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relationship between sign and interpretant, the Object is triadically inter-
spersed, and which is, doubtlessly, more than a mere referent of representation, 
if not its most important determination. Apart from this aspect of determina-
bility, deriving from the point of real otherness of the object in relation to the 
sign, one must consider that in the hierarchy of Peircean sciences, Phenome-
nology precedes Semiotics: the science of signs presupposes a being in the 
world that can no longer be ignored by a transcendent consciousness that seeks 
in itself a formal ground for a shapeless world: such a search would represent a 
theoretical heresy in the face of Peirce’s realism and of the foretold phenome-
nological hypothesis of the symmetry of the categories on the sphere of the 
interior and exterior worlds.  
With these considerations, the doctrine of Agapism adds to the myriad 
reasons that create the theoretical context in which Abduction would be justi-
fied77. 
This is the challenge of the reading of Peirce’s work: the eyes and intel-
ligence of his scholar should rest simultaneously on subject and object, not 
differentiating them under the prism of abstract forms. Another requirement is 
something not readily available in everyone’s spirit: a sense of poetry78, an aes-
thetic sensitivity that will, ultimately, become the sharpest and strongest tool to 
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